The plan called for a quick offensive, followed by an equally rapid capitulation. Overwhelming force and firepower would engender a quick endgame. With the action out of the way, the warriors would go home victorious. At least, that was what we all expected -- the question of failure never really entered anybody's minds. The issue was always whether or not to go to war, and the ability to successfully meet military goals was never called into doubt. However, this rosy picture has been shattered by developments on the ground.
It is painfully apparent that the story will not follow the script. As the war in Iraq lengthens, George Bush and Tony Blair have not lost their resolve. They have both issued statements indicating that the offensive will go on for as long as it takes. The British troops will continue to lay siege to the southern city of Basra, and will use commando-style raids to capture or eliminate senior Iraqi military leadership. The U.S. will not cease its costly bombing campaign, vowing that it will continue to pound Baghdad in preparation for a final assault. The security pertaining to the North-South supply line will be strengthened as the coalition forces take a short breather from their relentless push northwards.
However, developments on the ground have threatened to undermine the domestic support of the war. Coalition forces have suffered significant casualties. Although this number pales in comparison to the number of Iraqi soldiers that have certainly perished, it exceeds the expectations established by the previous Gulf War in 1991, when coalition forces advanced with far more ease. The latest round of Iraqi suicide bombings, which go against all standards of honorable military conduct and rules of engagement, only provide a glimpse into what could very well be a prominent feature of the war. Unorthodox Iraqi tactics, such as feigning surrender (only to shoot after lulling coalition forces into a false sense of security) and dressing up soldiers in civilian garb, will undoubtedly continue to contribute to the attrition rate of coalition forces.
A war effort -- particularly in a region where the direct interest of the U.S. is nebulous at best -- is ultimately predicated on domestic support. The Vietnam War is an illuminating example of this principle. For now, survey and poll results indicate that the American public largely supports Bush in his noble effort to rid the world of Saddam's regime. However, as time drags on and one becomes numb to the numerous "breaking news" updates that flash on the television screen, Bush's worst fears might well be realized -- the public may begin to ask questions, and they may begin to second-guess their previous support of the president.
The questions will first be about U.S. strategy and tactics. Should the Bush administration have planned for so few soldiers to go to Iraq? Should they have waited for Turkey to allow U.S. troops to use its military bases, which would have enabled the U.S. to directly open a northern front? Should Bush and Blair have tried to more actively incorporate foreign diplomacy into their overall war strategy? And should they have pressed for more active support and the commitment of troops from the otherwise passive group of countries that, in principle, support the war?
The military tactics pertaining to Operation Iraqi Freedom will not be spared as well. Should coalition forces have taken out the television network earlier instead of trying to save it for rebuilding efforts? Did the U.S. miscalculate the resolve of the Iraqi forces in attempting to bypass major cities en route to Baghdad? These questions may very well lead to the more fundamental question -- the one that Bush fears -- of whether the war should go on.
Developments on the ground could push public sentiment in either direction; for example, the use of chemical weapons may result in plummeting support for the war. Conversely, it could well strengthen the domestic resolve to see off Saddam, Chemical Ali and his band of brothers once and for all. Which direction sentiment will shift is ultimately unpredictable, although deft handling of the situation by the Bush administration could very well result in the latter outcome.
So far, Bush retains the fire in his belly and the American public supports the war -- for now. However, the popular sentiment might very well change in the next couple of weeks, and this is predicated on how the Bush administration handles any ground developments and an element of uncertainty. To this end, public sentiment -- not the military successes and failures on the ground -- could be the ultimate determinant of Saddam Hussein's fate.
