After the victory of American and coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union, former President George Bush proudly proclaimed the genesis of a "New World Order."
Under this new system of global relations, international cooperation and collective action would be the defining characteristics of crisis management. The end of the bipolar American-Soviet rivalry heralded a new era in which countries would build united fronts against aggressors, and the UN would assume a significant role in maintaining peace and stability. The events that have unfolded in Bosnia and Somalia, however, delivered a tragic blow to the fledgling New World Order.
The crises in Bosnia and Somalia reveal striking similarities. The aggressors in both instances have primitive military technology and capability compared to the might marshalled by the US and its allies during the war against Iraq.
Nevertheless, there is a surprising reluctance among major countries in the West to take substantial action against Serbian aggressors in Bosnia and Aidid's troops in Somalia. European nations and NATO have committed wholly inadequate resources in dealing with the bloodshed in Bosnia, and are unwilling to engage the Serbs in open warfare. The U.S. recently ended a major operation aimed at apprehending Aidid, and is even re-evaluating its humanitarian mission within the African state.
These results - Western powers retreating from substantially smaller adversaries - are a startling contrast to the resolve of the coalition forces which confronted Iraq.
As Europe and the U.S. diminished their role of international policing, the UN was expected to fill the void. Unfortunately, it has faced major obstacles after a brief surge of success during the Gulf War.
UN military operations in Bosnia have been hindered by Serbian soldiers on numerous occasions. In Somalia, Aidid's men proved to be far better opponents for peacekeeping manpower than was expected. The unwillingness of member nations to execute UN declarations with significant force has encouraged aggressors in both theaters to treat the international presence with increasing scorn and contempt.
Both situations bring to light a necessary condition for UN military operations: at least one dominant nation must support international efforts for conflict resolution. The U.S., though the last superpower, is backing away from these two foreign entanglements. Collectively, Europe can assemble a sizable contingent of force, but no single state has assumed the role of a leader.
These reversals of action have left the UN to conduct military operations without adequate forces to impress its resolutions upon Serbian and Somali opponents.
Due to this ineffectiveness of the major powers and the resulting inability to reinforce UN efforts, the focus has shifted from discouraging aggression to appeasing the aggressor. The Vance-Owen plan attempted to promote negotiations aimed at ending the Bosnian conflict; it also revealed that the international community had resigned itself to accepting Serbian gains into Bosnian territory. When the pursuit of Aidid proved to be too costly to the U.S. and lost domestic support, President Clinton offered Aidid a role in constructing a new governmental structure within Somalia.
Neither the U.S. nor Europe could discern possible benefits from resolution of the crises that would offset the perceived costs. Hence, substantive action has not been forthcoming.
In relations among countries, perceptions are often as important as reality. The perception of a weak and vacillating West will become more and more dangerous as other nations embark upon a course of action which they may have otherwise shunned. North Korea challenged what it saw as an indecisive President Clinton by refusing to allow inspections of its nuclear plants. The New World Order will be considered a mere paper tiger until the West is willing to put real teeth into its words.
The West's open willingness to compromise, rather than take a stand on principles of freedom and non-aggression, have emboldened Serbs and Somalis to seek further victories.
This is worsened by the repeated statements of Western leaders to take action at various stages, followed by the subsequent failure to execute concrete measures, such as threatening air strikes against Serbian positions but then refusing to employ the requisite airpower.
In fact, one can speculate if a quick and decisive response by the West against Serbian aggressors, coming on the heels of the Gulf War, would have compelled Aidid to reconsider such open defiance and resistance in Somalia. And one can predict, with justification, that the American failure in Somalia will make the American public and leadership highly resistant to committing substantial forces to Bosnia.
These two situations also illustrate paradoxes of the international system.
A world government would clearly serve to thwart aggression; but the failure of the UN has discouraged countries from relinquishing their sovereignty to such a body, which they perceive as being ineffectual in addressing these problems. In Bosnia and Somalia, extraordinary atrocities may be necessary to force the Western world to take significant and meaningful action. But the situations may have deteriorated to the point where Western governments may be unwilling to accept the high risks of imposing a solution upon a seemingly hopeless situation.
